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The paper addresses four research questions concerning the intergenerational occupational 
association in Italy. First, is there a direct effect of social background on occupational outcomes 
over and above the effect of education? Second, has the direct effect declined over time? Third, 
does it vary depending on the level of education achieved and, more precisely, is it weaker 
among more educated individuals? Finally, have returns to education changed over time in 
contemporary Italy?  
These questions are addressed using the Indagine nazionale sulla mobilità sociale (INMS, 
1985), the Indagine longitudinale sulle famiglie italiane (ILFI, 1997-2005) and the Indagine sui 
bilanci delle famiglie italiane (SHIW, 1992-2008). Many measures of success in the labour 
market (LM) are considered: a) ISEI score of the first job; b) ISEI score of the current job; c) 
net earnings of the current job. Moreover, we also look at class attainment in terms of d) the 
probability to enter the service class (EGP I-II) in the first job; e) the probability to enter the 
service class in the first or the current job; f) the probability to avoid the working class (EGP 
IIIb, V-VI-VIIab) in the first job; g) the probability to avoid the working class in the first and in 
the current job.  
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, there is a considerable effect of social 
origins on LM success. When controlling for education, this effect decreases substantially, but it 
stills remains pronounced. Second, this direct effect is largely stable over time. Third, it shows 
some variation conditioned on the education, but the sign of the interaction depends on the 
specific measure of LM success: in the case of social class it is negative, while in the case of 
income it is positive. Finally, there is strong evidence of credential inflation, involving both 
secondary and tertiary titles. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper looks at the occupational intergenerational association for the Italian case, studying 
four key research issues on this topic. First, we assess the direct effect of social background on 
occupational attainment, controlling for education. Second, we test whether this effect decreases 
over time, as postulated by modernization theories. Third, the interaction between education and 
social background is considered, that is to say we study whether the direct effect of social 
origins is stronger or weaker among more educated individuals. Fourth, the issue of credential 
inflation is addressed, namely we consider whether the influence of education on labour market 
success has declined over time. As we show in our literature review, such questions are 
particularly interesting in the Italian case: differently from its north-western neighbours, Italy 
was a late industrialisation country, and it is still debated whether the Italian society can be 
classified among the fully modernised ones. Thus, studying the Italian social stratification from 
the point of view of modernization theories and their critiques is interesting also from a 
theoretical point of view. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second paragraph briefly recaps the Italian discussion 
and the previous findings of the sociological and economic literature concerning the 
intergenerational occupational association and occupational returns to education. The third 
paragraph presents some descriptive evidence and formulates some hypotheses concerning the 
four research questions. The fourth paragraph presents the data, the variables and the modelling 
approach followed in the paper, while the fifth paragraph reports the main results of the 
empirical analyses. The sixth paragraph briefly discusses the findings and concludes.  
 
2. Late industrialisation and social stratification: the Italian debate 
It is well-known that Italy is a relatively newcomer among industrialized countries: as late as in 
the 1950s, foreign social scientists would travel across Italy to study local communities, 
particularly in the South, as ideal-type cases of backwardness (e.g. Banfield 1958). More 
recently, the Italian political economy has been described with the concept of “uneven 
modernization” (Martinelli et al 1999). In such a context, Italian sociologists and economists 
have looked at the structural parameters of social stratification as indicators of the level of 
development achieved by the country.  
The first structural parameter to be extensively studied was participation to education. The 
pioneering contribution by Barbagli (1982), using ecological data because of the lack of 
adequate individual-level surveys, found for the period from the 1870s to the 1960s an overall 
negative correlation between economic growth and participation to upper secondary and tertiary 
education. Participation would increase in periods and areas where the economy grew less and 
Occupational attainment in Italy 
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unemployment was higher. The idea was that in a context offering limited employment 
opportunities, people would choose to continue their education because of the lack of suitable 
labour market alternatives. In economic terms, the indirect (opportunity) costs of schooling are 
low. Thus, schools and universities become “parking lots”, where people are educated with a 
weak relation to external occupational perspectives in a country where the demand for highly 
skilled workers is low. The expansion of education becomes a self-reinforcing process as the 
excess of graduates creates an additional incentive to invest more in education, thus reinforcing 
the devaluation of education.  
According to this line of reasoning, what characterises social stratification in Italy is a general 
backwardness: thus, returns to education in Italy should be quite low (and possibly declining 
over time because of an excess of graduates with respect to the labour market demand), while 
the intergenerational occupational association should be correspondingly high. This dire picture 
was consistent with early evidence at the individual level, at least concerning returns to 
education: a survey on the university graduates of the academic year 1965-1966 (Censis 1971) 
found that only 14% of them were employed in manufacturing, while more than 2/3 of the total 
were employed in the civil service, mostly as teachers.   
 
Occupational achievement: the first wave of studies 
Research carried out in the 80s and the 90s brought the occupational intergenerational 
association into the picture, somehow weakening the “backwardness” paradigm of previous 
research. 
Concerning the gross association between education and occupation, analyses of census data for 
1951, 1961 and 1971 found a stable occupational advantage for those holding higher 
educational qualifications, with the partial exception of lower secondary degrees, whose 
occupational prospects seemed to be worsening over time (de Lillo and Schizzerotto 1982). The 
first Italian social mobility survey, fielded in 1985 (Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994; 1998), 
allowed to measure both the impact of education and the one of social origin on occupational 
attainment. Evidence showed that educational degrees are strong predictors of the class position 
of the first and the current job of Italians, for both men and women and across geographical 
areas. Controlling for education, the “ascriptive” effect of social class of origin on class 
attainment was also found to be significant, but its magnitude was substantially smaller than that 
of the effect of education. This result was consistent across OLS, logit and log-linear analyses. 
Concerning trend over time, log-linear analyses of social class did not find any significant 
change neither for the influence of education nor for the influence of social origin (Cobalti and 
Schizzerotto 1994). However, the logit models showed a decline over cohorts of the class 
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position of the first job, controlling for education, suggesting some growing imbalance between 
educational titles and qualified jobs opportunities for the younger, and more schooled, cohorts 
(Schizzerotto and Cobalti 1998).  
 Results from this work were part of the cross-national analysis performed by Müller and Shavit 
(1998). In comparative perspective, returns to education in Italy were found to be of 
intermediate magnitude concerning prestige score, high concerning the relative chances to 
access the service class, but relatively low concerning the probability to be employed.  
In their general interpretation, however, the authors somehow held to the backwardness 
hypothesis, as they attributed the strong impact of education to a “pervasive credentialism”, 
rather than to the working of a modern, meritocratic labour market, and they stressed the low 
levels of intergenerational relative mobility much more than the high rates of absolute mobility. 
In addition, they also stressed the relatively high level of unemployment of educated 
individuals, male tertiary graduates in particular
1
, which avoids the labour market displacement 
of the holders of lower titles on their part, and speculated that this might be the reason why no 
inflation of educational credentials had yet appeared in the Italian labour market (Cobalti and 
Schizzerotto 1994; 1998). 
 
Occupational achievement: recent research 
In the late 1990s, a set of major labour market reforms took place in Italy, increasing the 
flexibility of employment contracts in order to fight rising youth unemployment. This 
circumstance, coupled with the availability of new data from the first wave of the second Italian 
mobility survey (ILFI, see below), fielded in 1997, and of new techniques of analysis, pushed 
research on returns to education to concentrate on the labour market performance of individuals, 
with particular concern to the chances of being unemployed or employed with a non-standard 
contract. In both cases, the occupational value of education was found to be relatively low: 
education does not make a difference in the speed of the transition to the first job (Bernardi et 
al. 2000), and in recent cohorts educated people are even more at risk than the uneducated to 
end up in an atypical employment contract (Schizzerotto 2002; Barbieri and Scherer 2009). 
Also, an international comparison using LFS data showed that in Italy the advantage provided 
by an upper educational title in the chances of finding a job after graduation is much lower than 
in France, UK and even Spain (Reyneri 2005).  
However, scholars who studied occupational achievement in terms of class position kept finding 
the kind of evidence one would expect from a fully developed country. Bernardi (2003) 
                                                     
1
 In fact, no effect for either own education nor social origin was found on the probability of being 
employed (Schizzerotto and Cobalti 1998).  
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analyzed the occupational prestige of dependent workers from the 1997 ILFI sample by means 
of linear regression models with sample selection, and found a strong effect of education and a 
smaller, but significant, effect of class of origin. Comparing the cohort who left school in the 
50s and 60s with the one who left in the 80s and 90s, he also found evidence of credential 
inflation: the impact of secondary educational titles on job prestige had significantly decreased, 
while the impact of educational performance had increased. The effect of social class of origin 
on class attainment was found to be mostly stable over the two cohorts, with a strong tendency 
for social reproduction among employers and the self-employed in general. This picture was 
generally confirmed by the more recent work of Barone (2012), with a unidiff log-linear 
analysis for the cohorts born between 1925 and 1974. However, a previous analysis by Pisati 
and Schizzerotto (2004), also based on log-linear modelling, found increasing social fluidity 
between 1984 and 1997. In the same volume, the comparative analysis by Breen and Luijkx 
(2004) found Italy to be among the European countries with higher absolute mobility, at least in 
the case of men, and lower relative mobility (social fluidity) for both genders. Also, the study by 
Checchi et al (1999) found the intergenerational occupational mobility to be lower in Italy than 
in the US. 
Other studies of the association between social class of origin and occupational achievement 
measured the latter in linear terms. Results showed the association to be significant, but they 
were not consistent concerning the time trend: despite similar observation windows, Ballarino 
and Schizzerotto (2011) judged it to be fairly stable over time, while on the other side Zella 
(2010) found it to be decreasing. In both cases, the effect of educational achievement on 
occupational prestige was much higher, as expected, than the one of social origins.   
Returns to education were found to be declining by Schizzerotto and Barone (2006) whose logit 
models find a declining influence of upper secondary degrees in the chances of gaining access 
to the service class for all the employed of the 5 ILFI waves (1997-2005). Similar results were 
found on the same dataset also by Ballarino and Schizzerotto (2011) with both an OLS and a 
cumulative logit model (CLM) finding declining returns for both lower and upper secondary 
degrees, and by Ballarino and Scherer (2013), estimating CLM models on LFS data from 1985 
to 2010, excluding the traditional self-employed. While the latter paper could not estimate the 
effect of social origin, not available in the LFS data, it found, besides the already known 
downward trend for secondary education, also a less strong, but significant, decreasing trend for 
the association between a tertiary degree and the chances to get a position in the service class.  
In comparative perspective, Bernardi et al. (2004) looked at the school-to-work transition for 
dependent workers in Italy, the Netherlands and the US. Also in this case, results concerning 
returns to education did not show much backwardness for Italy. On the contrary, the main 
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difference turned out to be the one between the US, where a strong association between 
education and the timing of the transition to employment was found, and the two European 
countries, where the effect of education on transition to employment is absent (Netherlands) or 
even negative (Italy), but the advantage provided by education in terms of ISEI of the first job 
appears to be stronger than it is in the US, in particular for those with an upper secondary 
degree.  
Finally, to our knowledge, there is very little research for the Italian case concerning the 
interaction between the effects of social origins and of education on labour market success. The 
social mobility study by Cobalti and Schizzerotto (1994) reports that this interaction is not 
significant for class attainment, while a subsequent analysis by Schizzerotto and Barone (2006) 
finds that returns to education are higher for upper class children, as concerns both the chances 
of access to the service class and the risks of demotion into the lower classes. A more recent 




Research concerning the intergenerational income correlation (or elasticity) is relatively scarce 
in Italy, because of data problems, among which, in particular, the lack of a longitudinal data set 
including incomes of both fathers and sons. Indeed, respondents in cross-section data sets, such 
as the SHIW, are not even asked about their fathers’ income when they were younger, because 
of recollection bias. However, using the available techniques to overcome this problem, two 
similar papers by Piraino (2007) and Mocetti (2007) show the intergenerational income 
correlation in Italy to be strong and significant: their preferred estimates (in both cases the 
SHIW data are used) are just below .5. Controlling for education, the estimate decreases by less 
than one third (Piraino 2007), while quantile regression shows the correlation to be higher 
among the upper quantiles of the income distribution of the sons (Mocetti 2007).  
The quoted papers compare their estimates for Italy with similar studies for other countries, and 
find it to be relatively high. This is confirmed by the comparative OECD (2010) study, 
according to whose estimates Italy shows, with the US and the UK, the highest value of 
intergenerational correlation.  
Research concerning wage returns to education is typically the domain of economists estimating 
Mincerian equations, that is the effect of years of education on net wages. Early results from the 
80s showed wage premia to education in Italy to be comparatively low and generally stable over 
time, with some variations among different social groups and geographical areas (Brunello et al. 
1999, 2001; see also Checchi 2003).  
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More recent work confirms the comparative picture (OECD 2005; 2011), while the analysis of 
trends over time does not give fully consistent results. On one side, researchers testing the 
“skill-biased technological change”2 hypothesis (Acemoglu 2002) for the Italian case between 
the mid-90s and mid-00s found evidence, by means of quantile regression, of decreasing wage 
premia to both secondary and tertiary education all over the wage distribution of the private 
sector (Naticchioni et al. 2007). The finding was explained by supply-demand interactions, i.e. 
some kind of imbalance between the distribution of educational qualifications and the 
occupational structure (Naticchioni and Ricci 2009). On the other side, an instrumental variable 
analysis for the years 1995-2010 found stable wage premia to education (measured both as years 
of schooling and titles), with a slightly decreasing trend from 1998 on (Fiaschi and Gabbriellini 
2013).  
Generally, the economic literature on wage premia to education does not pay much attention to 
the direct effect of family background on income, controlling for education
3
. A recent work by 
Franzini and Raitano (2010), however, studies the effect on income of two measures of family 
background during the adolescence of the respondents: a situation of familiar financial distress 
and the occupational class of the father. OLS estimates on EU-SILC data for 13 countries show 
that in Italy both measures have a significant impact on wages, controlling for the individual’s 
education. In comparative perspective, the situation of the Mediterranean and of some 
Continental countries included in the study is similar to the Italian one, while in the 
Scandinavian countries the effects of family background on income, controlling for education, 
are generally non-significant.  
 
3. Descriptive evidence and hypotheses  
Before presenting our hypotheses, it might be of use to present some preliminary descriptive 
evidence concerning changes in the educational system and in the occupational structure. 
Indeed, according to modernization theory the intergenerational occupational association should 
decrease over time because of the increasing occupational relevance of formalized skills and 
abilities learned in the school system, as opposed to the informal transmission taking place 
inside the family. In modern societies the occupational outcomes of individuals with a given 
                                                     
2
 The skill-biased technological change (SBTC) argument maintains that current developments in the 
digitalization of labour processes and in the international division of labour give an increasing 
occupational advantage to the highly educated with respect to the poorly educated. According to the 
argument, this is where the increased college wage premium observed in the US since the 80s comes 
from.  
3
 Some econometric studies use family background variables, such as father’s education and/or 
occupation, as an instrument for years of schooling in Mincerian regressions of wages. This means 
assuming family background is not related to income, once education is controlled for. Brunello et al. 
(2000) acknowledge this assumption might be a problem.  
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educational title are function of both the number of individuals with the title available on the 
labour market, and of the skill demands of the economy (Goldin and Katz 2008). The ratio 
between the two measures can thus be thought of as a rough index of supply-demand (Bernardi 
2012).  
Figures 1-4 show the pattern over cohorts of birth of some relevant indicators and indices, 
starting from the pattern of the occupational structure in terms of the EGP social classes (see 
par. 4 below), reported in figure 1. There is evidence of some upgrading of the occupational 
structure, as in particular from the cohort born in the 30s to the one born in the 50s the share of 
the service and of the clerical classes increases notably. In the following cohorts, however, the 
upward trend gets slower. On the opposite side of the class structure, the agricultural classes 
almost disappear, while the share of the urban working class decreases from the third cohort on. 
We are in presence of a modernising occupational structure, in transition from an agricultural to 
an industrial and then a post-industrial society, but the trend appears to be relatively slow with 
respect to the expansion of education, as already pointed out by Barbagli (1982).  
Figure 2 shows the pattern of education over time. The expansion of educational participation is 
apparent: participation to primary education became universal with the cohorts born in the 40s, 
to lower secondary with the one born in the 60s. The expansion of upper secondary is also 
noteworthy, going from less than 20% in the 20s cohort up to around 60% in the most recent 
one. The expansion of tertiary education is less pronounced in absolute terms but nevertheless 
more relevant in relative terms, as participation goes from about 3% to over 16% from the first 
to the last cohort
4
.  
It is worth noting that such an expansion took place in a school system whose design did not 
change much over time. Compulsory education was set at 8 years as early as in the 20s, but it 
was not actually implemented until the 60s, and it was brought to 15 and then 16 as late as in the 
mid-90s. In comparative perspective, the Italian school system is a fully centralized and 
standardized one, while the level of stratification of the system can be said to be intermediate 
(Ballarino 2014).  
In its lower levels, the system was quite de-stratified over time. The existing exams selecting 
pupils at the elementary level were abolished at the end of the 50s, and a lower secondary 
unified track was introduced in the early 60s, substituting for a previous heavily tracked system. 
However, upper secondary education (from age 14 to 18) remained tracked, with a strong 
hierarchy and almost no horizontal circulation among tracks. In contrast to this, all upper 
secondary tracks lead to university, with almost no constraints but those created by universities 
                                                     
4
 Indeed, in relative terms (first cohort=100), the growth of upper secondary is at 484.5%, the one of 
tertiary at 546.4%. 
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and departments who introduce numerus clausus in their recruitment of students
5
. In 
postsecondary education, Italy has failed to develop a strong and well-recognised vocational 
sector and also after the “Bologna process” in recent decades Italian universities have preserved 
very limited connections with the labour market (Ballarino 2011). 
Figure 3 shows the pattern over cohorts of birth of two measures of the balance between 
education and demand for skills: the ratio between the percentage of university graduates and 
the percentage of jobs in the service class (EGP I+II) and the ratio between the percentage of 
upper secondary graduates and the percentage of jobs in the intermediate classes (EGP 
IIIab+IVab, clerical and self-employed). Both indices show an upward trend, meaning that the 
expansion of education has been stronger than the upgrading of the occupational structure, in 
line with findings from previous studies (Schizzerotto and Marzadro 2008; Barone 2012). 
Figure 4 shows our relation of interest as measured in metric terms, taking for each cohort the 
ratio between average ISEI and average years of education. Also in this case, the index increases 
over cohorts.   
 
about here figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
It is now possible to recap the four research question of the paper, and to formulate a set of 
hypotheses for the Italian case, based on both previous research and our own descriptive 
evidence. The first question is whether social origin has a direct effect on occupational success 
over and above education. We expect a positive answer to this question, not just on the basis of 
the previous research reviewed above but also in the light of two structural features of the Italian 
labour market. First, the large share of self-employment, where the direct influence of social 
origin is stronger. Second, the important role of personal and family networks for job search in 
Italy (Reyneri 2005; Ballarino and Bratti 2010).  
Our second question concerns the trend over time of this direct effect of social origins. Results 
of previous research on this are not consistent. However, because the two features that we have 
just mentioned have preserved their importance also in recent cohorts, there is little reason to 
expect that the direct influence of social origins has declined. Indeed, the figures reported above 
depict a worsening balance between the supply of educated individuals and the demand coming 
from the labour market. In such a context, the signalling value of educational titles should 
decrease, which in turn may strengthen the importance of other signals in the employee 
selection process. Among such signals, those related to the family background might be of 
                                                     
5
 It is worth noting that universities are prohibited by law to use the upper secondary track the applicant 
comes from to screen among candidates to programs with numerus clausus.   
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major importance in a service economy where soft skills gain growing importance, as suggested 
by Goldthorpe and Jackson (2008). We thus hypothesize stability, or even an increase over time 
of the intergenerational occupational association.  
Third, we ask whether this effect interacts with education. As explained above, there is little 
research on this topic for Italy and the few available studies reach different conclusions. 
Moreover, we have no specific theoretical hypothesis concerning the Italian case, therefore we 
simply start from a null hypothesis according to which there is no interaction. 
Finally, our fourth question concerns the trend over time of the effect of education on 
occupational success. Because our analyses focus on absolute returns to education, the previous 
descriptive evidence on the growing excess of highly educated individuals provides a 
straightforward argument to expect a major decrease of the occupational premia to education, 
particularly to secondary degrees which expanded most (see figure 2), while we expect a lower, 
but nevertheless sizeable, decrease of occupational returns to tertiary titles. Of course, the 
institutional features of the educational system may counteract these growing structural 
unbalances between supply and demand for skilled workers. However, this is hardly the case for 
Italy, where schools and universities entertain weak connections with the labour market: a 
standardized system, as the Italian one, might be associated with high returns to education, but 
the weakening over time of the connection between school and labour market might have fully 
counterbalanced this effect.  
 
4. Data and variables 
The data used in the chapter come from three national surveys: Indagine nazionale sulla 
mobilità sociale (INMS, 1985), Indagine longitudinale sulle famiglie italiane (ILFI, 1997-2005) 
and Indagine sui Bilanci delle Famiglie Italiane della Banca d'Italia (SHIW, 1992-2008). The 
first two are the major social stratification surveys fielded in Italy, including detailed 
information on subject’s current and first job, education and social origins, while the third 
source, fielded each other year by the Bank of Italy, mainly focuses on income and earnings. 
Occupational achievement is measured by means of four dependent variables (table 1): a) Isei 
score of first and current job; b) probability of entering the service class; c) probability of 
avoiding the working class; d) monthly net income, both linear and logged.  
 
about here table 1 
 
The first dependent variable is the ISEI score of first and current job. Unfortunately the INMS 
data does not allow to construct the ISEI score, hence in the analyses with this dependent 
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variable only the ILFI data are used. The analyses include natives aged 28-65 with some work 
experience. The final sample is made up by 6,258 cases. 
Concerning social class of destination, the EGP class schema is used (Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992; Breen 2004). Service class includes the occupations classified in EGP I-II, while the 
unskilled working class includes EGP IIIb, V-VI-VIIab. When these two variables are used, the 
INMS and ILFI surveys are merged. After excluding cases with missing information, the final 
analytical sample consists of 10,866 subjects
6
.  
Finally, the SHIW data (1992-2008) are used to study returns to education in terms of income. 
The analysis includes native born individuals aged 28-65 employed at time of interview. The 
final analytical sample consists of 172,395 cases. 
Two measures of social background are used. The first is the ISEI score of the family of origin. 
The second is social class of origin. Both are measured, as usual, on the basis of the highest 
parental occupational class when the respondent was 14 years old
7
. The EGP scheme here is 
aggregated into six categories: service class, white collars (IIIa), small employers with and 
without employees, self-employed farmers (IVc), urban working class (IIIb, V-VI-VIIa) and 
agricultural workers (VIIb). 
A second independent variable is respondent’s education, which is coded in four categories: a) 
primary or less (up to 5 years of schooling, including people with no schooling and with some 
schooling), b) lower secondary (8 years of schooling, this was the compulsory level of 
education in Italy from the 20s until the mid-90s), c) upper secondary (10 to 13 years of 
schooling), d) tertiary education (university and other shorter post-secondary courses). In a 
robustness check we also specified a more detailed classification of educational levels (see 
below). All analyses also control for gender (0=female; 1=male), age, age-squared, and 
geographical area of residence (1= North; 2= Centre; 3= South and Islands). 
We use OLS regression for ISEI score and monthly labour earnings and linear probability 
models with robust standard errors for the analysis of occupational class (access into the service 
class and avoidance of the working class). Our modelling strategy proceeds stepwise for each 
dependent variable. First, model 1 includes social background, age and age squared (or cohort 
of birth, see below). Model 2 adds respondent’s education, model 3 also gender and area of 
residence (as a control for labour market conditions, which display show strong geographical 
                                                     
6
 Italian stratification research often uses a slightly different version of the EGP scheme (see Ballarino 
and Cobalti 2003), where the lower part of EGP II is included in the clerks and not in the service class. 
Analyses were also repeated with this scheme, and results did not change (results available from the 
authors). 
7
 In both cases, if the father was missing respondents were asked about their mother or other heads of the 
household, and this information was used as family background. 
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variation in Italy). If results do not change from model 2 to model 3, we drop the results with 
full controls from the tables. 
Model specification is related to the availability of relevant information in the dataset. When it 
is possible, both first and current job are considered. In the latter case, models control for age 
and age squared, in the former for cohort of birth, when we consider the first job. To look at the 
trends over time, separate models of the attainment of the first job are estimated for each cohort 
of birth. Cohort is coded by decades of birth, starting from 1930–1939 up to 1970–1979. When 
numbers make it possible, individuals born between 1920 and 1929 are also included in the 
analysis. Unfortunately, the SHIW data do not include information on the first job, thus the 
analysis of income is limited to the current job. 
A wide range of robustness checks with different models and specifications were performed
8
. 
They include a) the estimation a logit model instead of a LPM for the analysis of occupational 
class; b) the replication of the analysis of occupational class and ISEI only for those employed; 
c) the replication of the analysis separately for men and women and for the youngest cohort (28-
45); d) finally, separate analyses across geographical areas. In all cases, results did not differ 
substantially from those presented in the next paragraph.  
 
5. Empirical results 
We move now to the empirical results, which will be presented according to the order of the 
research questions exposed above. Table 2 shows the results of a set of OLS models whose 
dependent variable is the ISEI score of the first job. It is clear that the answer to the first 
research question of the paper is a positive one: there is a significant effect of parental ISEI on 
respondent’s ISEI, over and above own education. Such an intergenerational occupational 
association is not trivial. According to model 1, where only parental ISEI, age and age squared 
are included, one point of parental ISEI produces an increase of almost half point of the ISEI 
score of the first job, while if education is entered into the equation the effect goes down to .20. 
This point estimate is higher for men but the difference with the estimate for women is not 
significant. Results for the current job are almost identical for our coefficient of interest
9
. 
Considering that the distance between top and bottom occupations in the ISEI scale is up to 75 
points, a direct effect of .20 means that individuals whose parents work in top occupations enjoy 
an advantage of 15 points in the ISEI scale over individuals with the same education but 
                                                     
8
 Results are not reported but are available on request from the authors. 
9
 It has to be noticed the lower value for the constant in the model for current job, explained by the fact 
that among the currently employed the proportion of males is higher, and males have a lower ISEI on 
average, as shown by models 4 and 5. 
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originating from a lower occupational group: this is a substantial effect
10
. For instance, this is 
the gap separating a professional from the technician giving her assistance (Ganzeboom and 
Treiman 1996).  
 
table 2 about here 
 
Tables 3 and 4 specify an analogous set of models where EGP classes are used instead of ISEI. 
In the models reported in table 3 the dependent variable is the probability to access the upper 
class (EGP I-II), while in those in table 4 it is the probability to avoid the working class (EGP 
IIIb, V-VI-VIIab). In both sets of models the service class is the reference category, so the 
coefficient for each class expresses the difference between the class and the service class in the 
probability of interest. In this specification the sample is bigger, as data from the INMS 1985 
have been included alongside those from the 5 waves of ILFI (1997-2005). The models confirm 
the results found for ISEI: when education is added to the model, there is a strong reduction of 
the family background effect, but it nevertheless remains non trivial for all classes.  
However, the finer specification of the family background and the bigger numbers allow to see 
more clearly two details. First, the advantage of an upper or middle class family background 
with respect to a working class one appears to be stronger with respect to avoiding the working 
class (table 4) than to moving upward into the service class (table 3). This makes sense, as the 
latter is an outcome much easier to be achieved than the former. Second, the effect of class 
origin on the probability to get a job in the service class is significantly lower for women than 
for men. This “gender gap” is also to be seen in the point estimates concerning access to the first 
job and avoiding the working class, but in that case it is not significant. The gender gap is likely 
to depend on the distribution of occupations across genders, where women are more likely than 
men to be found in occupations belonging to the lower ranks of the upper class (EGP II). In fact, 
if the analysis is carried out only on the probability of accessing EGP I the gender gap 




 tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
Table 5 reports a set of models where the dependent variable is net income, both linear (upper 
panel) and logged (lower panel). Unfortunately, the SHIW data do not allow to construct the 
                                                     
10
 This effect does not change at all if one uses another and more detailed specification of education, 
where 8 educational levels are considered (elementary / lower secondary / upper secondary academic / 
upp. sec. technical-vocational / upp. sec. other / tertiary humanities / tertiary scientific / tertiary other). 
Results are available from the authors.  
11
 Result not shown for lack of space, available on request from the authors. 
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ISEI score of the family of origin (nor do they provide informations on income, of course), so 
only EGP classes can be used as the measure of family background. Moreover, the data do not 
include information referring to the first job, so career effects cannot be fully eliminated from 
the estimate (as in all models, however, we control for age and age squared). Estimates confirm 
what found for occupational outcomes, showing a “class wage gap”, that is a significant effect 
of social origin on income, even when education is controlled for. Without this control (model 
1), someone with a service class background earns on average some 200 euros per month more 
than someone with a white collar background, and almost 600 euros per month more than 
someone with an urban working class background (table 5, upper panel). The class wage gap is 
reduced to about 140 and 330 euros, respectively, if education is controlled for (model 2), but it 
is still statistically significant and substantively important
12
. Comparing genders, it can be seen 
that the advantage provided by the class of origin appears to be stronger for women: the class 
wage gap (measured as difference from the service class) for the white collars is 74 euros for 
men and 160 for women, while in the case of the urban working class it is 280 euros for men 
and 360 for women. Thus, in the case of income the gender difference runs the other way round 
than in the case of social class, where the effect of the family background was found to be 
stronger in the case of men. While the latter phenomenon is likely to depend, as suggested 
above, on the gendered distribution of occupations, the former might be related to the lower 
average wages of women, who allows more room to the boosting effect of having a wealthy 
family
13
. In turn, this effect might depend on social networks and/or on the transmission of soft 
skills and other behavioural tracts enhancing performance and/or wages: more detailed 
information would be required in order to discriminate among possible explanations.  
 
table 5 about here 
 
Having seen that a direct effect of family background on occupation exists even when education 
is controlled for, we can move to our second research question, concerning the pattern over time 
                                                     
12
 Also in this case, a more detailed specification of education was used as a robustness check, 
distinguishing 13 levels: up to low. sec. / upp. sec. academic / upp. sec. technical / upp. sec. vocational /  
upp. sec. other / tertiary science / tert. medicine / tert. technical / tert. law / tert. social science / tert. 
humanities / tert. economics & business. A slight reduction of the effect of social origins for men with a 
petty bourgeois and a clerical origin was found, because they graduate less frequently in medicine with 
respect to those with a bourgeois origin.   
13
 The constant of the models for linear income in table 4 does not make substantive sense because age 
and age squared are included in the model. If the two terms are excluded, the constant, i. e. the average 
monthly income, is about  1,832 euros for women and 1,916 for men.   




. Does the intergenerational occupational association decrease over time, as 
modernization theories would suggest? Results are presented in figures 5 to 7. The first one 
reports the coefficients for parental ISEI provided by separate estimates for the five cohorts of 
birth of model 3 of table 1 (where respondent’s education is controlled for). As the graph shows, 
the confidence intervals are large, despite the relatively high numbers, and they overlap for all 
cohorts. Even if one looks only at the point estimates there is no trend over time to be seen.  
 
about here figures 5, 6 and 7 
 
This result is generally confirmed when social background is measured with the EGP class 
scheme. Figures 6 and 7 show the pattern over time of the difference between the service class 
and the other classes in the probability to enter the service class (figure 6) and to avoid the 
working class (figure 7). In all graphs, the horizontal axis at point 0 represents the service class 
(reference category). A problem with sample numbers can be easily noticed: when the sample is 
disaggregated by birth cohort, the estimates tend to lose their statistical significance, despite 
being significant if the whole sample is considered (as seen in tables 2 and 3). In any case, the 
pattern over time confirms what was suggested by the ISEI analysis, with just a (minor) 
exception: those born in the agricultural petty bourgeoisie (independent farmers, EGP IVcd ) 
show a significant downward trend in their chances to avoid a working class destination, when 
education is controlled for (figure 7, last panel on the right). This difference might be tentatively 
explained with the changing market situation of farmers, in particular with the decreasing life 
opportunities allowed by farming with respect to the urban classes
15
: while among the cohort 
born in the 20s independent farmers can be thought of as a part of the middle classes, one would 
surely not say the same for the cohort born in the 70s. This might have produced a negative 
selection into immobility in this class, decreasing in the process the capacity of its members to 
be of help to their own offspring on the labour market.   
We come now to the third research question of the paper, concerning a possible interaction 
effect between social origins, education and occupational achievement: does the 
intergenerational occupational association change according to the level of education?  
In order to answer this question, we estimate separate full control models (model 3) for each 
educational level. Table 6 shows models where respondent’s ISEI is regressed on parental ISEI: 
it can be seen that the coefficients for parental ISEI do not change significantly over the models. 
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 Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered for what income is concerned, as the SHIW dataset 
does not include information on the first job, making it impossible to distinguish between the income 
effect of education and the one of career. 
15
 The main reason for this worsening market condition lies in the mechanization of farming, who 
dramatically lowers the value of labor.  
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There are some differences in point estimates, in particular concerning the ISEI of the first job, 
where the effect of social origin is weaker among tertiary graduates, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (but notice the low numbers). When social class is used as a measure of 
family background (tables 7 and 8), however, more reliable evidence is found for the 
hypothesized interaction: as for the probability to avoid the working class, the advantage of the 
service class with respect to the other classes is not significant among tertiary graduates, while 
among the other educational strata those from the service class have a significant advantage 
over the other classes (excluding the white collars). Such a negative interaction between social 
origin and education might be explained with the argument suggested by Bernardi (2012): 
individuals with a good family background get more occupational help on the part of their 
families when their educational achievement is low, as families try to compensate the labour 
market weakness associated to a relatively low school title. However, when occupational 
success is measured with income the sign of the interaction is reversed.  
 
about here tables 6-7-8-9 
 
Indeed, according to the analysis reported in table 9, it is among tertiary graduates that the wage 
gap is stronger, i.e. that social origin has a stronger impact on income. In their case, those with a 
white collar background earn on average about 150 euro per month less than those who come 
from the service class, while for those with an urban working class origin the wage gap amounts 
to almost 390 euro. In the case of the lower secondary educated, however, there is no gap for 
those with a white collar background, while for the urban working class the gap reduces by two 
thirds, to about 130 euro. In the case of the primary educated there is almost no wage gap.  
Thus, different measures of occupational achievement lead to opposite results. In the case of 
social class (and, very weakly, of ISEI), there is some evidence that class of origin has a 
stronger effect on the occupational success of the less educated (“compensatory effect”), in 
particular for avoiding demotion into the working class. In the case of income, a high social 
background provides almost no occupational advantage among the less educated, while it gives 
a significant advantage among the university graduates (“boosting effect”). How can such 
diverging results be made consistent? The substantive difference between the two measures has 
to be considered. On one side, a wealthy family of origin can intervene to help those of their 
sons and daughters who do badly at school, providing them with relatively good occupational 
opportunities by means of family contacts and networks. But this intervention can hardly 
concern wages. Against any backwardness argument, in Italy as in every other developed 
country only exceptionally those with low educational titles can access the upper ranks of the 
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occupational stratification. When this is the case, they rely on outstanding personal qualities and 
skills, something not usually found among the offspring of the upper classes who do bad at 
school. On the other side, however, when someone with a good family background has a good 
school performance, achieving a title who allows her to enter the upper ranks of the social 
stratification, it is likely that her origins will give an extra boost to her job performance and/or 
her income, maybe via direct heritage, or career-enhancing networks, or soft skills developed in 
the family environment.  
An additional argument is that in Italy, as in many other European countries, wages at the lower 
and intermediate qualification levels are largely set by collective agreements, who put upper 
boundaries to wages, while the top tier of the labour market is less regulated, so that among the 
more educated, who are more frequently to be found in the top tier, there is more variation and 
thus more space for family background to affect wages.  
We come now, finally, to the fourth research question of the paper, regarding the trend over time 
of the association between own education and occupational success, controlling for class of 
origin. Also in this case, income cannot be used as a measure of occupational success, as the 
SHIW data set lacks information on the first job achieved. 
In this case, we have to adjudicate between two theories: while the theory of the inflation of 
educational credentials (IEC, Collins 1979; 2000) states that occupational returns to education 
decline over time, because of the expansion of educational participation, the theory of skill-
biased technological change (SBTC, Acemoglu 2002; Goldin and Katz 2008) suggests an 
increasing occupational advantage to the highly educated with respect to the poorly educated. 
As seen from the literature reviewed above, previous results for the Italian case point clearly 
towards a situation of IEC.  
Before entering the analysis, it is useful to observe that the two theories address the 
phenomenon from two different points of view, and are thus not mutually exclusive. IEC theory, 
indeed, is substantially interested in the comparison over time of returns to a given educational 
level, and in presence of educational expansion it forecasts diminishing returns to the same title. 
SBTC theory, on the contrary, is more interested in comparing over time wage returns to 
different titles. In other words, one could say that IEC theory is more interested in absolute 
returns, while SBTC is more interested in relative returns (Bernardi 2012, p. 5)
16
.   
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 It has to be noted that the absolute-relative distinction is used here in a way that differs from the 
common use in stratification research (eg Breen 2004, pp. 20 ff.). Indeed, we use OLS and linear 
probability models, who – differently from logit and log-linear models - do not control for the marginal 
distribution of the variables of interest, as it should be according to the common use of the term when 
relative inequalities are examined. For a brief discussion on this topic, see Bernardi and Ballarino (2014). 
In any case, logit specifications of the models reported were also estimated, and the pattern of the logit 
coefficients over cohorts is quite similar to the one of the OLS coefficients.  
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Thus, figure 8 shows the pattern over time of the ISEI of the first job by level of education, as 
provided by model 3 (table 2) estimated separately for each cohort (models control for class of 
origin, geographical area and gender). The panel on the left reports the “predicted values”, i.e. 
the pattern over cohorts of the average ISEI score of the first job for each educational title, that 
is absolute returns, while the panel on the right reports the relative returns, i.e. the difference in 
probabilities with respect to lower secondary as the reference category. Given the flat pattern of 
the predicted probabilities for the lower secondary educated, whose average ISEI score appears 
stable over time, there is no big difference between the two panels. In both, a decreasing trend 
for the ISEI of the tertiary educated can be easily seen, confirming the previous findings of the 
literature reviewed above. The average ISEI score of the first job of a tertiary educated born in 
the 30s was around 51.8 points, compared to about 39.0 for a tertiary educated born in the 70s. 
The difference is significant. For the other educational titles, however, there is not much of a 
trend to be seen.  
Moving to social class as a measure of family background, figure 9 shows the pattern of relative 
returns with respect to the service class, while figure 10 shows the pattern of absolute returns for 
all classes. In both cases, the panel on the left refers to the probability of accessing a first job in 
the service class, and the one on the right to the probability of avoiding the working class. 
Concerning the former outcome, a strong downward trend appears for those with an upper 
secondary degree. In absolute terms, for the cohort born in the 20s
17
 the average probability to 
access the service class was 0.53, while for the cohort born in the 70s the same probability 
amounts to 0.26 (fig. 10, left panel). The difference is significant. In the case of the tertiary 
educated there are also signs of decreasing returns, but the trend is not so strong and the 
confidence intervals are larger. However, in absolute terms, a tertiary educated born in the 20s 
and the 30s had a probability of well over .8 to enter the service class with her first job, while 
the same probability goes down to about .75 for someone born from the 60s on (fig. 10, left 
panel). The difference is significant with respect to the 30s cohort only, because of low numbers 
of the preceding one. 
Concerning the probability to avoid the working class, in relative terms (fig. 9, right panel) we 
see increasing relative returns for tertiary education and stability for the other classes. However, 
absolute returns show a different picture (fig. 10, right panel): while the pattern is stable for the 
tertiary educated, there are clear downward trends for both the lower and the upper secondary 
educated. In the case of the former, the probability of avoiding the working class goes is almost 
halved, from about 0.38 to about 0.19, while for the latter the same probability decreases by a 
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 When using social class, we can include in the analysis the cohort born in the 20s, available mostly in 
the INMS 85 dataset, while when we use ISEI, available in ILFI only, we have to exclude it because of 
low numbers.  
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factor of ¼,  from 0.81 to about 0.58. In relative terms, returns to tertiary education are thus 
increasing.  
Also in this case, apparent inconsistencies between analyses using different measures of 
occupational success have to be addressed. In the case of ISEI, a clear downward trend for the 
tertiary educated and stability for the secondary educated have been found, while in the case of 
occupational class the opposite happens, and evidence points to (some) stability for the tertiary 
educated and a strong decrease for the secondary educated. In order to make those findings 
consistent, again the substantive meaning of the variables has to be taken into account. While 
looking at the ISEI we are actually observing the average of the distribution of occupations, 
social class analysis gives more weight to the extremes, in particular when access to the upper 
class is used. Thus, the average ISEI of the first job of the secondary educated might have 
stayed the same over cohorts despite their decreasing probability of accessing the service class 
because the bottom of the occupational distribution has risen, compensating their loss at the top 
with a gain at the bottom. In a similar way, the average ISEI of the first job of the tertiary 
educated might have decreased over cohorts, because of lower points of entry in the labour 
market, but their advantage with respect to the holders of lower educational titles in accessing a 
stable number of service class positions might have increased over time.   
According to the preceding analysis, the general answer to our research question is that returns 
to education in Italy tend to diminish over time, in particular for those with a secondary 
education, but there are also some signs, for the younger cohorts, of a decrease of the returns to 
tertiary education for what access to the service class is concerned
18
. Our expectations are thus 
fully supported. Between the two competing theories briefly recalled above, our analysis 
supports to the ICE theory. However, if one compares returns to tertiary and secondary 
education over the last cohorts, it can be added that also the SBTC theory got it right, as the 
distance between the two groups has clearly increased to the advantage of the tertiary educated.  
 
6. Conclusions 
It might be useful to start this final paragraph with a brief recap of the main findings from the 
analyses reported above. First, a considerable direct effect of social origin on LM success was 
found, as expected, whichever the chosen measure of both variables. This effect is, however, 
much weaker than the direct effect of education, and it shows a gendered pattern, depending on 
the chosen outcome. When social class is considered, the family of origin effect is stronger in 
the case of men, while when income is considered, it is stronger among women.  
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 The strong resemblance of these findings with those obtained by Ballarino and Scherer (2013) with a 
different data set is worth noting.  
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Second, this intergenerational occupational correlation is substantially stable over time. This 
pattern is clear with both ISEI and social class, with the only minor exception of a significant 
decrease for the offspring of farmers, whose probability to avoid the working class has 
significantly decreased over cohorts.  
Third, the effect of interest changes according to the individual level of education. However, the 
pattern of change depends, again, on the chosen measure of achievement. When occupation-
based measures are used, a stronger direct effect of social origins is found among the lower 
educated, albeit significant only in the case of avoiding the working class (in the case of ISEI 
and access to the service class differences among educational levels are not significant, but the 
pattern is the same). When income is chosen, the direct effect of social origins is significantly 
higher among the more educated. In substantive terms, one could state that a privileged class 
origin can guarantee a decent occupation even to those who fail at school, compensating for the 
failure, but can hardly guarantee access to the privileged class itself or a higher income. 
However, when school performance is good and high levels of education are reached, the effect 
of the family of origin manages to boost success, making income higher.  
Finally, with all the considered outcomes there is evidence of diminishing returns to education 
over time (inflation of educational credentials), involving both secondary and tertiary titles. 
Also in this case different outcomes give different perspectives on the phenomenon. When ISEI 
is used, a significant downward trend for tertiary education and stability for secondary education 
appear, while when social class is used there is a strong downward trend for both lower and 
upper secondary education, and tertiary education is more stable. In absolute terms, class returns 
to tertiary education have decreased in the latest cohorts, in particular for the access to the 
service class, while in relative terms they increase with respect to those guaranteed by 
secondary education. However, also in this case different results might be made consistent by 
considering that ISEI, as a synthetic measure, is less influenced by variations in the extremes of 
the occupational distribution, differently from class-based measures. 
A methodological discussion should follow, concerning the relative merits of the different 
measures of occupational success used in the paper. In fact, the analyses above have shown 
diverging, and sometimes opposite, results for different measures. While space for a full 
discussion is not available here, there are a couple of points emerging from the findings of this 
paper, as well as from other papers in the project (Bernardi 2012) who might be worth 
mentioning. The first point is that one does not have to choose the better measure of labour 
market success, on the line of previous debates counterpoising categorical versus metric, or 
occupation-based against income-based measures. It might be more useful, on the contrary, to 
look at a wide range of measures, each of whom has limits which can be overcome only with a 
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comparison with results obtained with other measures. The second point is almost trivial, but 
worthwhile to be stated: while metric measures such as ISEI and income give a synthetic and 
parsimonious picture of the processes reproducing social stratification across generations, 
categorical measures as the neo-weberian occupational class scheme give a more detailed 
account of the processes of social stratification, and in particular of changes therein. While the 
former might be more useful for comparative purposes, it seems unlikely that the detailed 
investigation of the changes in the social stratification processes can proceed without using a 
categorical scheme such as the EGP. This is also acknowledged by economists, who 
increasingly use quantile regression to allow for heterogeneity of effects of variables of interest 
among individuals located in different points of the social stratification
19
.    
Finally, the findings of this paper might be related to the substantive discussion on the Italian 
case. As the brief review in paragraph 3 showed, a major part of the discussion on the relation 
between education and social stratification in Italy still takes place in a frame defined by the 
early hypotheses concerning the late industrialization and the related backwardness of the 
country. Even parameters typical of modern societies, such as the occupational advantage 
provided by education, have been explained as remnants from the past. This paper, as other 
recent work on this and related topics, suggests this kind of arguments to have lost their grip on 
empirical reality. Whichever point of view is chosen, contemporary Italy appears as a fully 
modern country, whose (strong) differences with respect to its Northern and Western neighbours 
should not be understood as legacies of a pre-modern past, but as the specific socio-economic 
configuration of the Italian way to a modern social stratification.  
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 See Piketty (2014: 266 ff.) for similar considerations.  
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Figure 9 – Probability that the first job is in EGP I-II and that the first job is not in the unskilled working 
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Figure 10 – Probability that the first job is in EGP I-II and that the first job is not in the unskilled working 
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Table 1 – Dependent variables, datasets and sample selection 
 Dependent variable Definition Sample  Dataset  
    








Native born aged 28-65 
with at least one work 
experience   
ILFI (6,258 cases)  
(Cohort 20-29 is lost) 
Probability of accessing 
the service class  
a) Probability that first 








b) Probability that first 
or current job is in EGP 
I-II.  
Probability of avoiding 
the working class 
a) Probability that first 
job is not in EGP IIIb, 
V-VI-VIIab  
b) Probability that first 
or current job is not in 
EGP IIIb, V-VI-VIIab 
Income Monthly net income of 
current job. 
Native born aged 28-65, 
employed at the time of 
interview 
SHIW  (172,395 cases) 
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Table 2 – Isei score of first and current job. 
ISEI First job 
 Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Men Women 
Parental 
ISEI 0,47*** 0,20*** 0,20*** 0,20*** 0,20*** 
 (0,45 - 0,50) (0,18 - 0,22) (0,18 - 0,22) (0,17 - 0,23) (0,16 - 0,23) 
      
Constant 10,93*** 15,90*** 15,37*** 13,92*** 18,60*** 
 (9,28 - 12,58) (14,42 - 17,39) (13,85 - 16,89) (12,02 - 15,82) (16,19 - 21,02) 
      
N 5532 5532 5532 2825 2707 
R-squared 0,22 0,46 0,46 0,49 0,43 
 
ISEI Current job 
 Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Men Women 
      
Parental ISEI 0,48*** 0,19*** 0,19*** 0,20*** 0,18*** 
 (0,45 - 0,51) (0,16 - 0,22) (0,16 - 0,22) (0,16 - 0,23) (0,13 - 0,22) 
      
Constant 6,10 7,59* 7,96** 4,86 8,40 
 (-3,52 - 15,7) (-0,23 - 15,41) (0,13 - 15,78) (-4,82 - 14,53) (-4,84 - 21,65) 
      
N 3773 3773 3773 2188 1585 
R-squared 0,20 0,48 0,48 0,52 0,43 
source: ILFI (1997-2005)
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Table 3 – Probability of accessing the service class (first and current job) 
P(first job in EGP I-II ) 
 All Men Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
White collars (IIIa)  -0,19*** -0,05** -0,22*** -0,08** -0,17*** -0,03 
 (-0,24 - -0,15) (-0,09 - -0,01) (-0,28 - -0,15) (-0,13 - -0,02) (-0,24 - -0,10) (-0,08 - 0,03) 
Urban petite bourg (IVab) -0,32*** -0,09*** -0,38*** -0,12*** -0,26*** -0,06** 
 (-0,36 - -0,28) (-0,12 - -0,06) (-0,43 - -0,33) (-0,17 - -0,07) (-0,31 - -0,20) (-0,11 - -0,01) 
I Indep. farmers (IVcd) -0,44*** -0,10*** -0,47*** -0,12*** -0,41*** -0,08*** 
 (-0,47 - -0,40) (-0,14 - -0,07) (-0,52 - -0,42) (-0,17 - -0,08) (-0,46 - -0,36) (-0,13 - -0,03) 
Urban wc (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -0,40*** -0,09*** -0,44*** -0,12*** -0,36*** -0,05** 
 (-0,43 - -0,37) (-0,12 - -0,06) (-0,48 - -0,39) (-0,17 - -0,08) (-0,41 - -0,31) (-0,10 - -0,01) 
Farm workers (VIIb) -0,49*** -0,10*** -0,50*** -0,12*** -0,49*** -0,08*** 
 (-0,53 - -0,45) (-0,14 - -0,07) (-0,56 - -0,45) (-0,17 - -0,07) (-0,54 - -0,43) (-0,13 - -0,03) 
       
Observations 8823 8823 4792 4792 4031 4031 
P(access to EGP I-II ) 
 All Men Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
White collars (IIIa)  -0,21*** -0,06*** -0,25*** -0,10*** -0,17*** -0,02 
 (-0,26 - -0,16) (-0,10 - -0,02) (-0,32 - -0,18) (-0,15 - -0,04) (-0,24 - -0,10) (-0,08 - 0,04) 
Urban petite bourg (IVab) -0,35*** -0,09*** -0,44*** -0,15*** -0,25*** -0,03 
 (-0,39 - -0,31) (-0,13 - -0,06) (-0,49 - -0,39) (-0,19 - -0,10) (-0,31 - -0,20) (-0,08 - 0,01) 
I Indep. farmers (IVcd) -0,49*** -0,10*** -0,56*** -0,15*** -0,43*** -0,05** 
 (-0,53 - -0,46) (-0,14 - -0,07) (-0,61 - -0,51) (-0,20 - -0,11) (-0,48 - -0,37) (-0,10 - -0,00) 
Urban wc (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -0,43*** -0,08*** -0,49*** -0,13*** -0,38*** -0,03 
 (-0,47 - -0,40) (-0,11 - -0,05) (-0,53 - -0,44) (-0,17 - -0,08) (-0,43 - -0,33) (-0,08 - 0,01) 
Farm workers (VIIb) -0,56*** -0,10*** -0,60*** -0,14*** -0,52*** -0,05** 
 (-0,59 - -0,52) (-0,14 - -0,07) (-0,65 - -0,55) (-0,19 - -0,10) (-0,57 - -0,46) (-0,11 - -0,00) 
       
Observations 8827 8827 4794 4794 4033 4033 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
source: ILFI (1997-2005) + INMS 1985
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Table 4 – Probability of avoiding the unskilled working class (first and current job). 
 P(first job is not in the unskilled working class)  
 All Men  Women  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
White collars (IIIa)  -0,17*** -0,05** -0,20*** -0,07** -0,14*** -0,02 
 (-0,22 - -0,13) (-0,09 - -0,01) (-0,26 - -0,13) (-0,13 - -0,01) (-0,21 - -0,08) (-0,07 - 0,04) 
Urban petite bourg (IVab) -0,21*** 0,01 -0,20*** 0,05** -0,22*** -0,04 
 (-0,25 - -0,17) (-0,03 - 0,04) (-0,25 - -0,15) (0,00 - 0,10) (-0,27 - -0,17) (-0,09 - 0,01) 
I Indep. farmers (IVcd) -0,32*** 0,01 -0,30*** 0,04 -0,34*** -0,01 
 (-0,36 - -0,28) (-0,03 - 0,05) (-0,36 - -0,25) (-0,02 - 0,09) (-0,39 - -0,28) (-0,06 - 0,05) 
Urban wc (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -0,48*** -0,18*** -0,49*** -0,19*** -0,46*** -0,16*** 
 (-0,51 - -0,45) (-0,21 - -0,15) (-0,54 - -0,45) (-0,23 - -0,14) (-0,51 - -0,42) (-0,21 - -0,12) 
Farm workers (VIIb) -0,63*** -0,25*** -0,62*** -0,24*** -0,65*** -0,25*** 
 (-0,67 - -0,60) (-0,29 - -0,21) (-0,67 - -0,57) (-0,29 - -0,19) (-0,71 - -0,60) (-0,30 - -0,19) 
       
Observations 8,823 8,823 4,792 4,792 4,031 4,031 
 P(avoiding the unskilled working class)  
 All Men  Women  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
White collars (IIIa)  -0,15*** -0,04** -0,17*** -0,07*** -0,12*** -0,00 
 (-0,19 - -0,11) (-0,08 - -0,01) (-0,22 - -0,11) (-0,12 - -0,02) (-0,18 - -0,06) (-0,05 - 0,05) 
Urban petite bourg (IVab) -0,17*** 0,02 -0,15*** 0,05** -0,19*** -0,02 
 (-0,20 - -0,14) (-0,01 - 0,05) (-0,19 - -0,11) (0,01 - 0,09) (-0,24 - -0,14) (-0,06 - 0,03) 
I Indep. farmers (IVcd) -0,28*** 0,02 -0,27*** 0,02 -0,29*** 0,03 
 (-0,32 - -0,24) (-0,02 - 0,06) (-0,32 - -0,22) (-0,03 - 0,07) (-0,35 - -0,24) (-0,02 - 0,09) 
Urban wc (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -0,41*** -0,15*** -0,41*** -0,16*** -0,40*** -0,11*** 
 (-0,44 - -0,38) (-0,17 - -0,12) (-0,45 - -0,37) (-0,20 - -0,12) (-0,44 - -0,36) (-0,15 - -0,07) 
Farm workers (VIIb) -0,58*** -0,23*** -0,56*** -0,24*** -0,60*** -0,19*** 
 (-0,62 - -0,54) (-0,27 - -0,18) (-0,62 - -0,51) (-0,30 - -0,19) (-0,66 - -0,54) (-0,25 - -0,13) 
       
Observations 8,829 8,829 4,795 4,795 4,034 4,034 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
source: ILFI (1997-2005) + INMS 1985
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Table 5 – Effect of class of origin on net monthly labour income. 
 Linear income 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Male Female 
      
 White collars (IIIa)  -205.92*** -137.80*** -119.46*** -73.98** -157.54*** 
 (-247.60 - -164.24) (-178.48 - -97.12) (-159.64 - -79.27) (-133.53 - -14.43) (-211.03 - -104.05) 
 Urban petite bourgeoisie (Ivab)  -414.07*** -246.41*** -227.56*** -188.14*** -253.46*** 
 (-457.40 - -370.73) (-289.04 - -203.78) (-269.67 - -185.45) (-250.66 - -125.62) (-309.40 - -197.51) 
 Independent farmers (IVc)  -615.91*** -338.25*** -315.41*** -288.84*** -323.11*** 
 (-661.26 - -570.57) (-383.41 - -293.08) (-360.11 - -270.72) (-355.10 - -222.59) (-382.58 - -263.65) 
 Urban working class (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -594.59*** -331.57*** -328.33*** -281.05*** -359.48*** 
 (-634.02 - -555.16) (-371.08 - -292.07) (-367.34 - -289.32) (-339.04 - -223.06) (-411.26 - -307.69) 
 Farm workers (VIIb)  -783.22*** -462.79*** -439.29*** -403.31*** -453.42*** 
 (-825.43 - -741.02) (-505.35 - -420.24) (-481.46 - -397.12) (-465.85 - -340.76) (-509.52 - -397.32) 
      
Observations 55,267 55,267 55,267 27,428 27,839 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.08 
 Logged income 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Male Female 
            
 White collars (IIIa)  -0.06*** -0.03** -0.02 0.02 -0.04** 
 (-0.09 - -0.03) (-0.06 - -0.00) (-0.04 – 0.01) (-0.02 - 0.05) (-0.08 - -0.00) 
 Urban petite bourgeoisie (Ivab)  -0.18*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.05** -0.11*** 
 (-0.21 - -0.15) (-0.12 - -0.06) (-0.11 - -0.05) (-0.09 - -0.01) (-0.15 - -0.07) 
 Independent farmers (IVc)  -0.30*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 
 (-0.33 - -0.27) (-0.18 - -0.12) (-0.16 - -0.10) (-0.15 - -0.07) (-0.19 - -0.11) 
 Urban working class (IIIb, V-VIIa)  -0.26*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.16*** 
 (-0.29 - -0.24) (-0.15 - -0.10) (-0.15 - -0.10) (-0.12 - -0.05) (-0.19 - -0.12) 
 Farm workers (VIIb)  -0.40*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.22*** 
 (-0.43 - -0.37) (-0.25 - -0.19) (-0.23 - -0.17) (-0.21 - -0.13) (-0.26 - -0.18) 
      
Observations 55,265 55,265 55,265 27,428 27,837 
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.07 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; source: SHIW, 1992-2008
Occupational attainment in Italy 
 41 
 
Table 6 – Effect of parental ISEI on ISEI of first and current job, by education 
ISEI First job 
 Primary Low sec. Upper sec Tertiary 
     
Parental ISEI 0,21*** 0,21*** 0,21*** 0,14*** 
 (0,16 - 0,27) (0,17 - 0,25) (0,17 - 0,24) (0,07 - 0,21) 
     
Constant 8,38*** 15,43*** 25,82*** 48,85*** 
 (6,67 - 10,09) (12,93 - 17,94) (21,66 - 29,99) (41,08 - 56,62) 
     
Observations 1,024 2,100 1,754 654 
R-squared 0,06 0,09 0,08 0,07 
ISEI Current job 
 Primary Low sec. Upper sec Tertiary 
     
Parental ISEI 0,15*** 0,22*** 0,20*** 0,15*** 
 (0,04 - 0,25) (0,16 - 0,27) (0,15 - 0,24) (0,08 - 0,22) 
     
Constant -15,61 5,96 26,56*** 26,71** 
 (-45,29 - 14,08) (-6,74 - 18,67) (13,70 - 39,42) (2,81 - 50,62) 
     
Observations 375 1,417 1,412 569 
R-squared 0,08 0,06 0,07 0,07 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
source: ILFI (1997-2005) 
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Table 7 – Effect of social class of origin on the probability of entering in the service class, by education 
First job in EGP I-II 
  Primary Low secondary High secondary Tertiary 
Social class of origin 
[ref.I-II] 
        
IIIab -0,11 -0,04 -0,03 -0,08* 
  (-0,25 - 0,03) (-0,11 - 0,02) (-0,10 - 0,04) (-0,16 - 0,00) 
IVab -0,13* -0,05* -0,12*** -0,08** 
  (-0,27 - 0,01) (-0,11 - 0,01) (-0,18 - -0,06) (-0,15 - -0,01) 
IVcd -0,13* -0,08** -0,14*** -0,04 
  (-0,27 - 0,01) (-0,13 - -0,02) (-0,22 - -0,06) (-0,14 - 0,05) 
V-VIIa -0,13* -0,06** -0,12*** -0,06* 
  (-0,27 - 0,01) (-0,12 - -0,00) (-0,17 - -0,06) (-0,12 - 0,01) 
VIIb -0,13* -0,09*** -0,12* 0,11*** 
  (-0,27 - 0,01) (-0,14 - -0,03) (-0,24 - 0,01) (0,03 - 0,19) 
Observations 2430 3013 2438 942 
Current job to EGP I-II 
  Primary Low secondary High secondary Tertiary 
IIIab -0,09 -0,09** -0,03 -0,10*** 
  (-0,24 - 0,05) (-0,17 - -0,01) (-0,10 - 0,04) (-0,17 - -0,03) 
IVab -0,12* -0,10** -0,13*** -0,05* 
  (-0,26 - 0,02) (-0,17 - -0,02) (-0,19 - -0,07) (-0,10 - 0,00) 
IVcd -0,12* -0,13*** -0,12*** -0,11** 
  (-0,26 - 0,01) (-0,21 - -0,06) (-0,20 - -0,03) (-0,19 - -0,02) 
V-VIIa -0,12* -0,11*** -0,08*** -0,02 
  (-0,26 - 0,01) (-0,18 - -0,03) (-0,14 - -0,02) (-0,07 - 0,02) 
VIIb -0,13* -0,13*** -0,09 0,02 
  (-0,26 - 0,01) (-0,21 - -0,06) (-0,22 - 0,03) (-0,02 - 0,07) 
          
Observations 2430 3013 2439 945 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 – Effect of social class of origin on the probability of avoiding the working class, by education 
Probability that the first job is not in the working class 
  Primary Low secondary High secondary Tertiary 
IIIab -0,19* -0,07 -0,05 -0,01 
  (-0,38 - 0,01) (-0,18 - 0,03) (-0,11 - 0,01) (-0,07 - 0,05) 
IVab -0,06 0,05 -0,06** 0,01 
  (-0,24 - 0,12) (-0,04 - 0,15) (-0,11 - -0,00) (-0,03 - 0,06) 
IVcd 0,10 -0,09* -0,17*** -0,00 
  (-0,08 - 0,27) (-0,18 - 0,01) (-0,24 - -0,09) (-0,07 - 0,06) 
V-VIIa -0,23*** -0,20*** -0,19*** -0,02 
  (-0,40 - -0,06) (-0,29 - -0,11) (-0,24 - -0,14) (-0,07 - 0,03) 
VIIb -0,27*** -0,26*** -0,27*** 0,07*** 
  (-0,44 - -0,09) (-0,35 - -0,16) (-0,40 - -0,14) (0,02 - 0,12) 
          
Observations 2,430 3,013 2,438 942 
Probability of avoiding the working class 
  Primary Low secondary High secondary Tertiary 
IIIab -0,13 -0,07 -0,04 -0,04* 
  (-0,34 - 0,08) (-0,18 - 0,04) (-0,09 - 0,01) (-0,08 - 0,01) 
IVab 0,02 0,03 -0,04* -0,00 
  (-0,16 - 0,21) (-0,06 - 0,13) (-0,08 - 0,00) (-0,02 - 0,02) 
IVcd 0,13 -0,10* -0,12*** -0,04 
  (-0,05 - 0,31) (-0,20 - 0,00) (-0,18 - -0,05) (-0,09 - 0,01) 
V-VIIa -0,16* -0,20*** -0,13*** -0,01 
  (-0,33 - 0,02) (-0,29 - -0,11) (-0,17 - -0,08) (-0,04 - 0,01) 
VIIb -0,22** -0,24*** -0,22*** 0,01 
  (-0,40 - -0,04) (-0,34 - -0,13) (-0,34 - -0,10) (-0,01 - 0,03) 
          
Observations 2,430 3,013 2,440 946 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
source: ILFI (1997-2005) + INMS 1985 
 
  
Table 9 – Effect of social class of origin on income, by education 
 Linear income 
 Primary Low secondary Upper secondary Tertiary 
 White collars (IIIa)  -8,25 114,53* -78,27** -153,91*** 
 (-100,85 - 84,35) (-17,88 - 246,93) (-155,47 - -1,08) (-267,56 - -40,27) 
 Urban petite bourgeoisie (IVab)  -159,48*** -37,51 -178,17*** -235,07*** 
 (-251,03 - -67,94) (-161,67 - 86,64) (-260,70 - -95,65) (-362,26 - -107,87) 
 Independent farmers (IVc)  -215,69*** -86,13 -287,51*** -461,14*** 
 (-307,87 - -123,51) (-206,80 - 34,54) (-374,52 - -200,49) (-597,07 - -325,21) 
 Urban working class (IIIb, V-
VIIa)  -131,08*** -40,20 -296,24*** -387,91*** 
 (-219,06 - -43,09) (-157,74 - 77,34) (-370,89 - -221,59) (-503,68 - -272,15) 
 Farm workers (VIIb)  -233,03*** -95,16 -348,13*** -541,88*** 
 (-322,47 - -143,59) (-213,92 - 23,60) (-428,41 - -267,85) (-676,13 - -407,62) 
     
Observations 21,081 10,408 17,563 6,215 
R-squared 0,26 0,16 0,25 0,27 
Log income 
 Primary Low secondary Upper secondary Tertiary 
 White collars (IIIa)  0,04 0,05 -0,00 -0,03 
 (-0,03 - 0,10) (-0,07 - 0,18) (-0,04 - 0,04) (-0,08 - 0,01) 
 Urban petite bourgeoisie 
(IVab)  -0,07** -0,06 -0,06*** -0,08*** 
 (-0,14 - -0,01) (-0,18 - 0,05) (-0,10 - -0,02) (-0,14 - -0,03) 
 Independent farmers (IVc)  -0,12*** -0,11* -0,13*** -0,15*** 
 (-0,19 - -0,05) (-0,22 - 0,00) (-0,17 - -0,08) (-0,23 - -0,08) 
 Urban working class (IIIb, 
V-VIIa)  -0,04 -0,05 -0,12*** -0,13*** 
 (-0,10 - 0,02) (-0,16 - 0,06) (-0,16 - -0,08) (-0,19 - -0,08) 
 Farm workers (VIIb)  -0,11*** -0,10* -0,14*** -0,20*** 
 (-0,18 - -0,05) (-0,22 - 0,01) (-0,18 - -0,10) (-0,28 - -0,13) 
     
Observations 21,081 10,406 17,563 6,215 
R-squared 0,18 0,12 0,23 0,25 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
source: SHIW, 1992-2008 
 
